Explore MCP Servers & Agent Skills

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench

Turns kube-bench output into a finished CIS Kubernetes Benchmark audit: interpreting PASS/FAIL/WARN per control, judging which failures are genuine on a managed cluster, writing remediation, and packaging evidence for SOC 2 or PCI DSS. Use when conducting a scheduled compliance audit, triaging kube-bench results, deciding which controls are not applicable on EKS, GKE, or AKS, or producing hardening evidence for an auditor. Keywords: CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, control plane, remediation, compliance evidence, SOC 2, PCI DSS, managed cluster exception. Do not use for installing and running the tool - use benchmarking-kubernetes-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes

Hardens Kubernetes RBAC by designing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles, auditing RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts, and integrating an external OIDC identity provider. Use when tightening cluster access control, removing excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening service-account permissions against escalation and lateral movement. Keywords: RBAC, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, least privilege, service account, OIDC, cluster-admin. Do not use for discovering existing escalation paths - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-kubernetes-pod-security-standards

Chooses and applies the correct Kubernetes Pod Security Standard (Privileged, Baseline, Restricted) for a workload: what each profile forbids, how to map existing workloads to a profile, which securityContext fields must change, and how to plan a PodSecurityPolicy-to-PSS migration without breaking running pods. Use when deciding which pod security profile a namespace or workload should run under, auditing which workloads would fail Restricted, planning a PSP migration, or mapping pod security posture to a compliance control. Keywords: Pod Security Standards, PSS, Privileged, Baseline, Restricted, securityContext, runAsNonRoot, drop ALL capabilities, seccomp RuntimeDefault, PSP migration. Do not use for configuring the admission controller that enforces these profiles - use implementing-pod-security-admission-controller.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico

Installs Calico as the cluster CNI and writes standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy under it, covering default-deny baselines, policy ordering and precedence, service-account-based selectors, and verifying that policy is genuinely being enforced. Use when adopting Calico as the enforcement CNI, establishing a default-deny baseline, or debugging why a NetworkPolicy is not taking effect under Calico. Keywords: Calico CNI, NetworkPolicy, default deny, policy order, Felix, service account selector. Do not use for Calico-only CRDs such as GlobalNetworkPolicy or DNS egress - use implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico; for CNI-agnostic policy use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/benchmarking-kubernetes-with-kube-bench

Installs and runs the kube-bench tool against a Kubernetes cluster as a Job, DaemonSet, or standalone binary, selecting the correct benchmark version and targets (control plane, etcd, kubelet, worker nodes) and emitting JSON or JUnit output for pipelines. Use when setting kube-bench up for the first time, choosing which benchmark version and node targets to run, wiring it into CI, or troubleshooting skipped or misdetected checks. Keywords: kube-bench, DaemonSet, --benchmark, --targets, JSON output, JUnit, CI integration. Do not use for interpreting the findings or producing an audit report - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation

Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and rakkess, tracing which subjects can escalate toward cluster-admin. Use when reviewing who can escalate privileges in a cluster, hunting exploitable RoleBindings during an authorized review, or validating least privilege after an RBAC change. Keywords: RBAC, ClusterRoleBinding, service account token, auth can-i, rbac-police, escalate, bind, impersonate. Do not use for designing and applying hardened RBAC - use implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/analyzing-kubernetes-audit-logs

Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access, and builds SIEM detection rules from the event patterns. Use when investigating a suspected cluster compromise, reconstructing what an attacker did through the API server, or writing Kubernetes-specific detection content. Keywords: audit policy, audit log, kube-apiserver, exec into pod, RBAC change, anonymous access, detection rules. Do not use for syscall-level detection inside a running container - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco. '

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-kubernetes-manifests-with-kubesec

Scores Kubernetes resource manifests with Kubesec to flag misconfiguration and privilege-escalation risk before deployment, mapping each finding back to the securityContext change that fixes it. Use when gating manifests in CI, reviewing YAML or a rendered chart before it reaches a cluster, or explaining why a manifest scored negatively. Keywords: Kubesec, manifest score, securityContext, readOnlyRootFilesystem, runAsNonRoot, CI gate. Do not use for scanning built images for CVEs - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy; for admission-time enforcement use implementing-opa-gatekeeper-for-policy-enforcement.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-container-images-with-grype

Scans container images, filesystems, and SBOMs for known CVEs with Anchore Grype, matching Syft-generated SBOM packages against NVD, GitHub Advisories, and OS-specific feeds with configurable severity thresholds and failure gates. Use when Grype or Syft is the chosen toolchain, when scanning an existing SBOM rather than an image, or when gating a build on severity. Keywords: Grype, Syft, SBOM, NVD, GitHub Advisory, --fail-on, severity threshold. Do not use when the toolchain is Trivy - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-container-security-scanning-with-trivy

Runs Trivy across every target type it supports - container images, filesystems, Git repositories, and Kubernetes clusters - for OS and dependency vulnerabilities, IaC misconfiguration, exposed secrets, and licences, generating CycloneDX or SPDX SBOMs. Use when integrating Trivy into CI/CD, deploying the Trivy Kubernetes operator, scanning non-image targets, or triaging results at scale. Keywords: Trivy, trivy k8s, operator, SBOM, CycloneDX, SPDX, misconfig, secret scanning. Do not use for a single Docker image scan - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless

Reduces container attack surface by building application images on Google distroless base images that ship only the application runtime - no shell, package manager, or OS utilities - using multi-stage build patterns plus debugging and scanning techniques adapted to distroless. Use when hardening container images, cutting attack surface in a container architecture, or answering an assessment finding about bloated base images. Keywords: distroless, multi-stage build, no shell, nonroot tag, debug image, scratch, attack surface. Do not use for scanning an image for known CVEs - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/detecting-container-escape-attempts

Detects container escape at runtime across tooling - namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, sensitive host mounts, and anomalous syscalls - and explains which signals matter regardless of whether Falco, Sysdig, auditd, or an EDR is doing the collection. Use when deciding what breakout behaviour to monitor, investigating a suspected Docker or Kubernetes breakout, or comparing escape coverage across runtime sensors. Keywords: container escape, breakout, namespaces, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, privileged, hostPath, kernel exploit, syscall. Do not use for Falco rule syntax itself - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules; for a static configuration sweep use performing-container-escape-detection.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/escaping-containers-to-host

Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco

Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords: Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falcosidekick, runtime security, syscall. Do not use for authoring individual escape rules - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-docker-images-with-trivy

Scans a Docker image with Trivy for vulnerabilities in OS packages and language dependencies, misconfiguration, exposed secrets, and licence violations, emitting SARIF, CycloneDX, or SPDX output. Use when scanning or gating a specific image, wiring an image scan into CI/CD, or checking an image during an incident investigation. Keywords: Trivy, image scan, --severity, --exit-code, SARIF, ignore file, .trivyignore. Do not use for cluster-wide scanning or non-image targets - use performing-container-security-scanning-with-trivy; when the toolchain is Grype use scanning-container-images-with-grype.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration

Hardens the Docker daemon (dockerd) through /etc/docker/daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS client authentication, seccomp profiles, and CIS Docker Benchmark controls such as icc, no-new-privileges, and live-restore. Use when securing a Docker host's daemon to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon settings against CIS requirements. Keywords: dockerd, daemon.json, userns-remap, no-new-privileges, icc, live-restore, TLS socket. Do not use for hardening images and per-container runtime flags - use hardening-docker-containers-for-production.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/hardening-docker-containers-for-production

Hardens Dockerfiles, images, and per-container runtime settings against the CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0: non-root users, dropped capabilities, read-only root filesystem, seccomp and AppArmor profiles, and minimal multi-stage builds, validated with docker-bench-security, Hadolint, and Dockle. Use when preparing a container or Dockerfile for production, or auditing images and runtime flags against CIS Docker controls. Keywords: Dockerfile, USER, --cap-drop, read-only rootfs, seccomp, AppArmor, multi-stage, Hadolint, Dockle. Do not use for the Docker daemon's own configuration - use hardening-docker-daemon-configuration.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing

Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise. Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes

Writes portable upstream Kubernetes NetworkPolicy YAML - default-deny-all, DNS egress, namespace and pod selector rules - that works on any conformant CNI such as Calico or Cilium. Use when segmentation must stay CNI-portable, introducing a default-deny posture, or restricting east-west traffic between pods and namespaces without depending on a vendor CRD. Keywords: NetworkPolicy, default deny, podSelector, namespaceSelector, ingress, egress, CNI portable. Do not use for Calico-specific resources - use implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-docker-bench-security-assessment

Runs Docker Bench for Security, the open-source CIS Docker Benchmark audit script, across host configuration, daemon settings, images, and runtime configuration, then interprets pass/fail/warn output and remediates the common failures. Use when auditing Docker hosts for CIS compliance, scheduling recurring container assessments, or validating runtime hardening controls after a change. Keywords: docker-bench-security, CIS Docker Benchmark, audit script, pass fail warn, host configuration, remediation. Do not use for applying the daemon hardening itself - use hardening-docker-daemon-configuration.

io.github.vinta/awesome-python/review-prs

Triage open PRs — screen from the diff, delegate the admission judgment to audit-the-list, then merge or close on GitHub. Fire when the maintainer asks to review PRs, process the PR queue, or judge whether a specific PR should be merged.

io.github.prisma/prisma/prisma-8

Comprehensive guide for building with Prisma 8 (Prisma Next), the contract-first data layer. Use whenever working on Prisma code in a project that uses it — authoring or editing the data contract (contract.prisma, PSL, TypeScript builders), migrations, queries (db.orm / db.sql), runtime wiring (db.ts, middleware, DATABASE_URL), build-tool integration, Supabase / RLS, reading PN-* structured errors, or filing feedback — and for orientation questions like "what is Prisma Next" or comparisons to other ORMs. Signals that this skill applies: @internal/* imports, prisma.config.ts, contract.prisma / contract.json / contract.d.ts, the prisma-next CLI, PN-* error codes. Does not apply to Prisma ORM 7 or earlier (schema.prisma + @prisma/client projects).

io.clawhub.conorbronsdon/avoid-ai-writing

Audit and rewrite content to remove AI writing patterns ("AI-isms"). Use this skill when asked to "remove AI-isms," "clean up AI writing," "edit writing for AI patterns," "audit writing for AI tells," or "make this sound less like AI." Supports a detect-only mode, an edit-in-place mode for files, an optional voice profile (casual / professional / technical / warm / blunt), and an iterate-to-convergence pass.