Agent Skill 目录与安装教程 — ClawHub、SkillsMP 与开源 Skill

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign

Signs and verifies container image provenance with Sigstore Cosign, covering key-based and keyless OIDC signing (Fulcio, Rekor transparency log), SLSA attestations, and enforcing signature verification through Kubernetes admission control. Use when signing images for supply chain security, setting up keyless OIDC signing, attaching attestations, or enforcing a verified-images-only policy at admission. Keywords: Cosign, Sigstore, Fulcio, Rekor, keyless, attestation, cosign verify, admission policy. Do not use for in-toto layout-based pipeline attestation - use implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-container-escape-detection

Audits container and pod configuration for escape-enabling misconfiguration using the Kubernetes Python client - privileged flags, dangerous capability grants, host path mounts, shared namespaces, and CVE-2022-0492 style cgroup abuse. Use when sweeping a cluster for workloads that could break out, producing a posture report, or checking configuration before enforcement is switched on. Keywords: privileged, hostPath, hostPID, capabilities, CVE-2022-0492, cgroup, kubernetes python client, posture audit. Do not use for runtime syscall-based detection - use detecting-container-escape-attempts. '

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico

Uses Calico's own policy CRDs beyond the upstream Kubernetes API - GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, NetworkSet, policy tiers, and DNS-based egress rules - applied and audited with calicoctl. Use when a policy must span namespaces or protect the host itself, when egress has to be expressed by domain name, or when ordering policies into tiers. Keywords: calicoctl, GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, NetworkSet, tier, DNS egress, order. Do not use for portable upstream NetworkPolicy - use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes; for installing Calico and writing standard policy with it use implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-opa-gatekeeper-for-policy-enforcement

Deploys OPA Gatekeeper via Helm as a Kubernetes admission controller and writes ConstraintTemplates with Rego plus instantiated Constraints to validate, mutate, or deny resource requests at admission time. Use when enforcing custom policy-as-code at admission on Kubernetes v1.24+, blocking non-compliant workloads before scheduling, or expressing a rule that built-in controls cannot. Keywords: Gatekeeper, ConstraintTemplate, Constraint, Rego, admission webhook, audit, mutation. Do not use for the standard pod security profiles that Pod Security Admission already covers - use implementing-pod-security-admission-controller.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods

Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission control (OPA policies), runtime monitoring (Falco), and audit log analysis of security contexts, Linux capabilities, and syscall patterns. Use when investigating a pod running as root or privileged, hardening workloads against in-pod escalation, or hunting for containers exceeding their intended scope. Keywords: allowPrivilegeEscalation, runAsRoot, capabilities, securityContext, OPA, Falco, audit log. Do not use for escalation through RBAC and service-account permissions - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench

Turns kube-bench output into a finished CIS Kubernetes Benchmark audit: interpreting PASS/FAIL/WARN per control, judging which failures are genuine on a managed cluster, writing remediation, and packaging evidence for SOC 2 or PCI DSS. Use when conducting a scheduled compliance audit, triaging kube-bench results, deciding which controls are not applicable on EKS, GKE, or AKS, or producing hardening evidence for an auditor. Keywords: CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, control plane, remediation, compliance evidence, SOC 2, PCI DSS, managed cluster exception. Do not use for installing and running the tool - use benchmarking-kubernetes-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes

Hardens Kubernetes RBAC by designing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles, auditing RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts, and integrating an external OIDC identity provider. Use when tightening cluster access control, removing excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening service-account permissions against escalation and lateral movement. Keywords: RBAC, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, least privilege, service account, OIDC, cluster-admin. Do not use for discovering existing escalation paths - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico

Installs Calico as the cluster CNI and writes standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy under it, covering default-deny baselines, policy ordering and precedence, service-account-based selectors, and verifying that policy is genuinely being enforced. Use when adopting Calico as the enforcement CNI, establishing a default-deny baseline, or debugging why a NetworkPolicy is not taking effect under Calico. Keywords: Calico CNI, NetworkPolicy, default deny, policy order, Felix, service account selector. Do not use for Calico-only CRDs such as GlobalNetworkPolicy or DNS egress - use implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico; for CNI-agnostic policy use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/benchmarking-kubernetes-with-kube-bench

Installs and runs the kube-bench tool against a Kubernetes cluster as a Job, DaemonSet, or standalone binary, selecting the correct benchmark version and targets (control plane, etcd, kubelet, worker nodes) and emitting JSON or JUnit output for pipelines. Use when setting kube-bench up for the first time, choosing which benchmark version and node targets to run, wiring it into CI, or troubleshooting skipped or misdetected checks. Keywords: kube-bench, DaemonSet, --benchmark, --targets, JSON output, JUnit, CI integration. Do not use for interpreting the findings or producing an audit report - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation

Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and rakkess, tracing which subjects can escalate toward cluster-admin. Use when reviewing who can escalate privileges in a cluster, hunting exploitable RoleBindings during an authorized review, or validating least privilege after an RBAC change. Keywords: RBAC, ClusterRoleBinding, service account token, auth can-i, rbac-police, escalate, bind, impersonate. Do not use for designing and applying hardened RBAC - use implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/analyzing-kubernetes-audit-logs

Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access, and builds SIEM detection rules from the event patterns. Use when investigating a suspected cluster compromise, reconstructing what an attacker did through the API server, or writing Kubernetes-specific detection content. Keywords: audit policy, audit log, kube-apiserver, exec into pod, RBAC change, anonymous access, detection rules. Do not use for syscall-level detection inside a running container - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco. '

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-kubernetes-manifests-with-kubesec

Scores Kubernetes resource manifests with Kubesec to flag misconfiguration and privilege-escalation risk before deployment, mapping each finding back to the securityContext change that fixes it. Use when gating manifests in CI, reviewing YAML or a rendered chart before it reaches a cluster, or explaining why a manifest scored negatively. Keywords: Kubesec, manifest score, securityContext, readOnlyRootFilesystem, runAsNonRoot, CI gate. Do not use for scanning built images for CVEs - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy; for admission-time enforcement use implementing-opa-gatekeeper-for-policy-enforcement.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-container-images-with-grype

Scans container images, filesystems, and SBOMs for known CVEs with Anchore Grype, matching Syft-generated SBOM packages against NVD, GitHub Advisories, and OS-specific feeds with configurable severity thresholds and failure gates. Use when Grype or Syft is the chosen toolchain, when scanning an existing SBOM rather than an image, or when gating a build on severity. Keywords: Grype, Syft, SBOM, NVD, GitHub Advisory, --fail-on, severity threshold. Do not use when the toolchain is Trivy - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless

Reduces container attack surface by building application images on Google distroless base images that ship only the application runtime - no shell, package manager, or OS utilities - using multi-stage build patterns plus debugging and scanning techniques adapted to distroless. Use when hardening container images, cutting attack surface in a container architecture, or answering an assessment finding about bloated base images. Keywords: distroless, multi-stage build, no shell, nonroot tag, debug image, scratch, attack surface. Do not use for scanning an image for known CVEs - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/detecting-container-escape-attempts

Detects container escape at runtime across tooling - namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, sensitive host mounts, and anomalous syscalls - and explains which signals matter regardless of whether Falco, Sysdig, auditd, or an EDR is doing the collection. Use when deciding what breakout behaviour to monitor, investigating a suspected Docker or Kubernetes breakout, or comparing escape coverage across runtime sensors. Keywords: container escape, breakout, namespaces, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, privileged, hostPath, kernel exploit, syscall. Do not use for Falco rule syntax itself - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules; for a static configuration sweep use performing-container-escape-detection.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/escaping-containers-to-host

Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco

Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords: Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falcosidekick, runtime security, syscall. Do not use for authoring individual escape rules - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/scanning-docker-images-with-trivy

Scans a Docker image with Trivy for vulnerabilities in OS packages and language dependencies, misconfiguration, exposed secrets, and licence violations, emitting SARIF, CycloneDX, or SPDX output. Use when scanning or gating a specific image, wiring an image scan into CI/CD, or checking an image during an incident investigation. Keywords: Trivy, image scan, --severity, --exit-code, SARIF, ignore file, .trivyignore. Do not use for cluster-wide scanning or non-image targets - use performing-container-security-scanning-with-trivy; when the toolchain is Grype use scanning-container-images-with-grype.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/hardening-docker-daemon-configuration

Hardens the Docker daemon (dockerd) through /etc/docker/daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS client authentication, seccomp profiles, and CIS Docker Benchmark controls such as icc, no-new-privileges, and live-restore. Use when securing a Docker host's daemon to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon settings against CIS requirements. Keywords: dockerd, daemon.json, userns-remap, no-new-privileges, icc, live-restore, TLS socket. Do not use for hardening images and per-container runtime flags - use hardening-docker-containers-for-production.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/hardening-docker-containers-for-production

Hardens Dockerfiles, images, and per-container runtime settings against the CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0: non-root users, dropped capabilities, read-only root filesystem, seccomp and AppArmor profiles, and minimal multi-stage builds, validated with docker-bench-security, Hadolint, and Dockle. Use when preparing a container or Dockerfile for production, or auditing images and runtime flags against CIS Docker controls. Keywords: Dockerfile, USER, --cap-drop, read-only rootfs, seccomp, AppArmor, multi-stage, Hadolint, Dockle. Do not use for the Docker daemon's own configuration - use hardening-docker-daemon-configuration.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing

Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise. Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes

Writes portable upstream Kubernetes NetworkPolicy YAML - default-deny-all, DNS egress, namespace and pod selector rules - that works on any conformant CNI such as Calico or Cilium. Use when segmentation must stay CNI-portable, introducing a default-deny posture, or restricting east-west traffic between pods and namespaces without depending on a vendor CRD. Keywords: NetworkPolicy, default deny, podSelector, namespaceSelector, ingress, egress, CNI portable. Do not use for Calico-specific resources - use implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico.

io.github.mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/integrating-dast-with-owasp-zap-in-pipeline

Integrates OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) into GitHub Actions and GitLab CI pipelines, covering baseline, full, and API scan configuration against running applications, ZAP finding interpretation, scan policy tuning, and DAST quality gates. Use when testing running web apps or REST/GraphQL APIs for XSS, SQLi, CSRF, and auth/authz flaws, or when SAST alone is insufficient and runtime DAST is required for compliance or release gating.